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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE  
 
Chamber of Progress is a tech industry coalition devoted to a progressive 
society, economy, workforce, and consumer climate. It is an industry organization 
that backs public policies that will build a fairer, more inclusive country in which all 
people benefit from technological leaps. Its work is supported by corporate partners, 
many of whom will be subject to the law at issue.1 
The Connected Commerce Council (3C) is a nonprofit membership 
organization with a single goal: to promote small businesses’ access to essential 
digital technologies and tools. 
As North America’s largest technology trade association, CTA® is the tech 
sector. Its members are the world’s leading innovators – from startups to global 
brands – helping support more than 18 million American jobs. CTA owns and 
produces CES® – the most influential tech event in the world.2 
Engine Advocacy (“Engine”) is a nonprofit technology policy, research, and 
advocacy organization that bridges the gap between policymakers and startups. 
Engine works with government representatives and a community of high-
                                                
1 Chamber of Progress’ Partners are available at: https://progresschamber.org/. 
Chamber of Progress’ partners do not sit on its board of directors and do not have a 
vote on or veto over its positions. 
2 A complete list of the Consumer Technology Association’s members is available 
at: http://cta.tech/Membership/Membership-Directory.aspx. 




technology, growth-oriented startups across the nation to support the development 
of technology entrepreneurship. 
Founded in 2006, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is 
an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit, nonpartisan research, and educational 
institute—a think tank. Its mission is to formulate, evaluate, and promote policy 
solutions that accelerate innovation and boost productivity to spur growth, 
opportunity, and progress. 
LGBT Tech Institute is a national, nonpartisan group of LGBT organizations, 
academics, and high technology companies. It engages with critical technology and 
public policy leaders about media, technology, and telecommunications issues of 
specific concern to LGBTQ communities. 
Since 2003, the National Black Justice Coalition (NBJC) has been America’s 
leading national civil rights organization dedicated to the empowerment of Black 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer+, and same gender loving 
(LGBTQ+/SGL) people, including people living with HIV/AIDS through coalition 
building, federal policy change, research, and education. 
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and 
political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically 
pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. 




TechNet is the national, bipartisan network of technology CEOs and senior 
executives that promotes the growth of the innovation economy by advocating a 
targeted policy agenda at the federal and 50-state level. TechNet’s diverse 
membership includes dynamic American businesses ranging from startups to the 
most iconic companies on the planet and represents over four million employees and 
countless customers.  
The Washington Center for Technology Policy Inclusion (WashingTECH), a 
nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporation, is an advocacy platform committed to 
civil rights, empowerment, justice, and inclusion in technology public policy 
making. As America’s “inclusive voice of tech policy,” WashingTECH’s mission is 
to convene diverse technology public policy professionals to defend America’s rich 
diversity with programs that promote an inclusive narrative about technology’s 
impact on society. 
Amici3 have a substantial interest in ensuring that consumers can enjoy a 
healthy online environment where they can effectively and efficiently work, play, 
learn, shop, connect, and communicate without harassment, disinformation, and 
incendiary content. To ensure that online services are inclusive, useful, and safe, 
                                                
3 The term “Amici” includes Chamber of Progress, 3C, CTA®, Engine, ITIF, 
LGBT Tech Institute, NBJC, PPI, TechNet, WashingTECH. 




online providers4 take actions, often referred to collectively as “content 
moderation.”5 Online providers understand that these actions are necessary to 
support the innovation economy and promote equitable access to the benefits of 
technological innovations. 
Florida’s S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg. (Fla. 2021) (“Act”) poses a direct threat to 
healthy and safe online communities by restricting and penalizing online providers’ 
efforts to exercise their First Amendment rights to moderate content on their private 
platforms. Laws, like S.B. 7072, that seek to regulate content moderation are 
extremely important to Amici, because the parties Amici represent routinely engage 
in or benefit from content moderation. Amici have substantial interests here as the 
outcome will impact the ability of providers to offer and consumers to access safe 
online platforms. 
                                                
4 Sections 2 & 4 of S.B. 7072 apply to “social media platforms,” which are defined 
as “any information service, system, internet search engine, or access software 
provider that...enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including an Internet platform or a social media site.” Section 501.2041(1)(g). 
“Social media site” is merely an example of a covered service. Covered entities 
include virtually any online service provider that satisfies the other definitional 
requirements (e.g., revenue or global users thresholds). Id. Instead of this 
misnomer, Amici refer throughout this brief to covered entities as “online 
providers” or “providers.” 
5 “Content moderation” generally refers to how online providers “decide to publish 
or remove third-party content.” Eric Goldman, Content Moderation Remedies, 
Mich. Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021), Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies 
Research Paper, at 6, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810580. 




Amici certify that (1) no party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; 
(2) no party or a party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund 
preparing or submitting the brief; and (3) no person—other than the Amici, their 
members, or their counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing 
or submitting the brief.  Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this 
brief. Thus, amici have authority to file this brief.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Florida officials assert that S.B. 7072 benefits its residents.6 Amici strongly 
disagree. The Act will harm Floridians by exposing them to dangerous and 
objectionable content that today is screened out by provider content moderation 
efforts. The Act’s inevitable harm to consumers is directly relevant to the legal issues 
Appellants have identified for the court’s review, including the likelihood of success 
on the merits of Appellees’ claims, the risk of irreparable injury, the relative 
hardships the parties may suffer if the Act is or is not enjoined, and the public 
interests the Act impacts.  
The Act impinges on the millions of content moderation actions that online 
providers take every day to enable consumers to effectively and safely use their 
services by: (1) forbidding moderation except under strict, content-based 
exceptions; (2) imposing undue burdens on moderation activity; and (3) subjecting 
                                                
6 Appellant Br. 54. 




providers to unreasonable legal risks and penalties for potential violations of the 
Act’s draconian rules.  
If the Act is enforced, consumers will lose the benefits of healthy, inclusive, 
and widely accessible online communities and services. Providers will be forced to 
change or significantly reduce their moderation practices to limit liability risk or 
change their products in ways that could transform the services they provide. As a 
result, consumers will be exposed to more scams, harassment, hate speech, explicit 
content, and misinformation, making online services more dangerous for vulnerable 
populations such as children, teens, and seniors, and inhospitable to frequently 
targeted communities. No benefit the state may assert can outweigh the 
countervailing public interest in protecting consumers. The Act must remain 
enjoined to avoid the inevitable incurable harm it will cause.  
Amici urge the Court to affirm the district court’s judgment entering a 
preliminary injunction to prevent S.B. 7072 from taking effect. The court correctly 
determined that Plaintiffs NetChoice LLC and Computer & Communications 
Industry Association (“Plaintiffs”) met the legal standard for a preliminary 
injunction given the serious constitutional concerns with the bill and imminent risks 
of irreparable harm to online providers and their customers. 
ARGUMENT 
 
Online providers set and enforce rules to serve and protect their consumers. 




In this way, providers’ rules are like a private university's honor code, with content 
moderation serving the role of sanctions that the university imposes for violations. 
Compliance with the honor code is a condition of admission and continued 
enrollment; as are a provider’s rules for its users. Honor codes reflect judgments the 
institution has made to create an environment conducive to learning and consistent 
with the university’s mission. So too, provider rules reflect similar judgments about 
the best way to ensure that their services may be used for their intended functions. 
Unlike the conduct at issue in Rumsfeld v. FAIR,7 which Appellants rely on heavily, 
an online provider’s content moderation policies and enforcement decisions pervade 
every aspect of an online service,8 and they are expressive activities protected by the 
                                                
7 Appellants rely heavily on Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006), but that 
reliance is misplaced. See, e.g., Appellant Br. 9, 22-23. The Supreme Court 
regarded the activity in FAIR, access to on-campus recruiting events, to be conduct 
rather than speech, as acknowledged by Appellant’s brief. Id. at 22. Contrary to the 
state’s assertion that “the hosting regulations are less intrusive” than the 
requirement in FAIR, the impact of that conduct was far more limited considering 
the importance content moderation has for the everyday operation of online 
services. Id. Appellant also argues that providers could “expressly disavow any 
connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the 
speakers or handbillers stand.” Id. at 25 (citations omitted); see also id. at 27 
(“platforms...have...an unlimited ability to respond with their own speech to 
counter any hosted user speech with which they disagree”). This ignores the Act's 
restrictions on providers’ speech. See Section 501.2041(1)(b) (defining “censor” to 
include adding an “addendum”) & Id. (2)(j)(restricting acts that “censor” 
journalistic enterprises).  
8 Some providers differentiate themselves from competitors based on their 
approach to content moderation. See, e.g., Press Release, TMTG (Oct. 20, 2021) 
(announcing Truth social network as an alternative to “liberal” big tech platforms 




First Amendment.9   
Content policies and enforcement are foundational to online services in other 
ways. Without the ability to create and enforce policies on their own, a provider’s 
ability to generate revenue could decrease—because a poorly moderated service, 
with objectionable and unwanted content lessens their appeal to advertisers, content-
creators, and other revenue-generating partners. Likewise, content moderation 
practices can be an important consideration for consumers in deciding whether to 
use, or continue to use, a service.10 Boycotts, petitions, shareholder proposals, 
employee protests, and high profile defections have all been used to criticize 
provider content moderation policies and practices.11 Thus, by necessity, content 
                                                
featuring “non-woke” video programming), https://www.tmtgcorp.com/press-
releases/announcement-10-20-2021/. 
9 See, e.g., e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (finding Google’s decisions about the order of search results and 
whether sites violated their rules are protected by the First Amendment). See also, 
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (company’s 
search engine results were protected by First Amendment).   
10 See, supra, n. 8. Marketing statements by new entrants to the social media 
industry urge consumers to move to their platforms, because existing providers are 
so “anti-conservative” in their content moderation practices that they do not 
adequately serve non-liberals. Frank Witsel, Parler's off-line, but CloutHub, Gab, 
MeWe and Rumble promoting apps as free speech zones, Detroit Free Press, 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/nation/2021/01/15/clouthub-gab-mewe-rumble-
free-speech/4149176001/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2021). 
11 See, e.g., Damian J. Troise, Social media companies face revenue hit from 
boycotts, ABC News (July 2, 2020), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/social-media-companies-face-revenue-
hit-boycotts-71574640; The Action Network, 




moderation policies also reflect carefully weighed judgements about what measures 
are essential to attract and retain consumers and advertisers and limit corporate risk 
and reputational damage.12  
Consumers benefit from the many incentives to create healthy and trustworthy 
online communities because they reduce the amount of illegal, “lawful but awful,” 
and irrelevant content they must wade through in their daily activities, whether 
research for work or school or planning travel, a big purchase, or where to eat that 
night. For some communities, like the LGBTQIA+ community or communities of 
color, it may be the difference between using a service or being driven off by 
constant barrage of hate and harassment.13 
                                                
https://actionnetwork.org/petitions/tell-twitter-covid-button/thankyou (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2021); Nitasha Tiku, Investors Join Calls for Facebook, Twitter to Take 
More Responsibility, Wired (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/investors-join-calls-for-facebook-twitter-to-take-
more-responsibility/; Paige Leskin, Facebook Content Moderators Join Revolt 
Over Handling of Trump Posts, Business Insider (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-content-moderators-protest-virtual-
walkout-donald-trump-posts-2020-6; Maria Yagoda & Sophie Dodd, 23 Stars Who 
Quit Social Media … and How Long They Stayed Away, People (updated Mar. 25, 
2021), https://people.com/celebrity/stars-who-quit-social-media-justin-bieber-
leslie-jones/.  
12 In a Business Insider survey 96% of users said decisions about whether to 
engage with paid content on social media are impacted by whether they felt safe to 
participate on a platform. Facebook ranks last in digital trust among consumers, 
Business Insider (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-is-
consumers-least-trusted-social-media-platform-2020-9.  
13 See, e.g., LGBT Tech, Declaration in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, ¶13, NetChoice v. Paxton, No. 21-cv-00840-RP (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 
2021), ECF No. 12-5. 




To create a healthy, safe, and trustworthy environment that fosters these goals, 
some of the policies and practices providers may adopt include: 
● screening for spam, viruses, malware, phishing, scams, child sexual 
abuse material, terrorist propaganda, and other policy violations; 
● responding to reports from the public, consumers, and trusted partners 
about hate speech; harassment; impersonation; posting non-consensual intimate 
images;  doxxing; deadnaming; and promotion of suicide and self-harm; 
● labeling, restricting, or rating content that may not be appropriate for 
certain audiences (such as graphic violence) or that is regulated (such as tobacco or 
alcohol ads); and 
● removing, demoting, or limiting the spread of content that disrupts or 
degrades the online experience, including disinformation, abusive language, and 
content that may be simply irrelevant to the function of the service.14 
I. THE ACT HARMS CONSUMERS 
 If allowed to take effect, the Act will be detrimental to consumers of online 
services. The Act will cause this harm in three, immediate ways by: (1) prohibiting 
provider actions that protect consumers; (2) interfering with provider actions to 
                                                
14 See, e.g., Tripadvisor, Traveler Review Guidelines (last updated Oct. 22, 2021), 
https://www.tripadvisorsupport.com/hc/en-us/articles/200614797-Traveler-review-
guidelines (TripAdvisor’s Traveler Review Guidelines requiring that reviews are 
relevant). 




protect consumers and improve services; and (3) chilling content moderation activity 
by imposing litigation risk with potentially crippling damages and penalties on 
providers’ efforts to protect consumers.  
A. THE ACT PROHIBITS ACTIONS THAT PROTECT 
CONSUMERS 
 
Several provisions of the Act directly prohibit online providers from engaging 
in content moderation.15 The most blatant of the prohibitions on content moderation 
are the Act’s provisions limiting enforcement of content policies against candidates 
for public office and “journalistic enterprises.”16 The Act essentially renders 
providers powerless to moderate these two categories of speakers—no matter what 
they say or do, giving these speakers a virtual free pass to do as they like on any 
service that qualifies as a “social media platform.”17   
For example, the Act would require child-friendly online services, such as 
Roblox or YouTube Kids, to treat certain pornographic sites as “journalistic 
enterprises” subject to only limited moderation. This is because the Act defines 
“journalistic enterprise” according to the amount of content a site publishes and the 
                                                
15 See, e.g., Section 106.072(2); Section 501.2041(2)(b)-(d), (h) & (j). 
16 See Section 106.072(2), Section 501.2041(2)(h) & (j). Section 106.72(5) limits 
enforcement of the law when it conflicts with federal law. The only other 
exceptions are for obscenity. See, e.g., Section 501.2041(2)(j) (allowing 
deplatforming a journalistic enterprise for obscenity); cf. Section 106.072(2) (not 
applying an obscenity exception to political candidates).  
17 Section 501.2041(1)(g); See supra n. 4. 




number of users it has, not by any activity associated with journalism. The 
pornography site PornHub appears to meet the criteria for a “journalistic enterprise,” 
and would likely be protected from content moderation under the Act.18    
This prohibition directly interferes with the ability of providers to set and 
enforce rules for adult content and creates immediate harm for the millions of parents 
and caregivers who seek out safe spaces online that children can visit without 
constant supervision or worry about exposure to content that may not be appropriate 
for the child’s age.19 The Act prevents sites geared toward children from screening 
out pornographic content posted by a “journalistic enterprise,” unless it qualifies 
under state or federal law as “obscenity”—leaving “R” or “mature” rated content 
that does not rise to that high standard safe from moderation on children’s sites.20  
                                                
18 An entity qualifies as a journalistic enterprise if it “publishes 100 hours 
of...video...with at least 100 million viewers annually.” Section 501.2041(1)(d)(2). 
PornHub has an estimated 7,000 years of video and 130 million users. 
https://www.pornhub.com/insights/tech-review. 
19 See Aaron Smith, Skye Toor & Patrick Van Kessel, Many Turn to Youtube for 
Children’s Content, News, How-To Lessons, Pew Research Ctr. (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/11/07/ many-turn-to-youtube-for-
childrens-content-news-how-to-lessons/; Factbox: The Nuts and Bolts of Roblox, 
Reuters (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gaming-roblox-
factbox/factbox-the-nuts-and-bolts-of-roblox-idUSKBN27Z1FZ. 
20 Section 501.2041(2)(j) (providing an obscenity exception to prohibitions on 
content moderation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (setting out 
test for obscenity); Fla Stat. § 847.001(10) (defining obscenity under Florida law). 




Foreign state-controlled media21 are sure to exploit this special treatment for 
journalistic enterprises to sow discord and spread disinformation.22 The Act will 
require providers to suspend measures they currently take to label, fact-check, 
demote, and remove disinformation coming from state-controlled media.23 In 
addition, providers will be wary of acting against potential journalistic enterprises 
and thus may not remove profiles and content from state-sponsored disinformation 
campaigns masquerading as U.S. media entities.24  
The restriction on deplatforming a candidate for office poses similar dangers. 
Many users simply seeking to avoid moderation could exploit this exception. The 
requirements to be a candidate in Florida are minimal25 and the restriction on 
deplatforming is not explicitly limited to candidates who notify providers through 
                                                
21 Section 501.2041(d). Only one of the four criteria for a journalistic enterprise 
contains a U.S. nexus. 
22 See, e.g., Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rep. No. 116-290: Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns And Interference In The 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: 
Russia's Use Of Social Media (Nov. 10, 2020), 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2
.pdf 
23 See, e.g., Twitter Help Center, About government and state-affiliated media 
account labels on Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/state-
affiliated (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).  
24 See S. Rep. No. 116-290, Vol. 2 at 55. 
25 See Fla. Stat. § 99.061. 




the mechanism mandated in the Act.26 A user claiming to be a candidate will likely 
be given a wide berth because of fear of triggering penalties of up to $250,000 per 
day.27 The Act also gives special protections to posts about a political candidate.28 
These provisions create significant openings to spread lies about candidates that 
cannot be undone later—depriving the public of fair and honest elections.    
B. THE ACT BURDENS ACTIONS THAT PROTECT 
CONSUMERS 
 
 The Act has several provisions that amount to constructive prohibitions on 
content moderation by imposing unreasonable burdens, making it impossible for 
providers to engage in the full range of policy enforcement necessary to protect 
consumers. For example, the Act imposes a host of notice,29 post-removal,30 and 
disclosure requirements31 on a broad set of content moderation activities.32 These are 
                                                
26 Section 106.072(2). The Act mandates that providers make the mechanism 
available, but not that candidates use it to receive preferential treatment. 
27 Section 106.072(3).  
28 Section 501.2041(2)(h). 
29 See id.(2)(d) (requiring notices to be provided when content is “censored”); 
Id.(2)(a) & (c) (requiring notices of rules and rule changes). 
30 See id.(2)(e) (requiring disclosure of the number of viewers of user content); 
Id.(2)(i) (requiring services to allow terminated users 60 days to download their 
content). 
31 See Section 501.2041(2)(g) (requiring annual notice of post-prioritization 
algorithms); See also id.(3) (describing required disclosures for notices under 
subparagraph (2)(d)).  
32 See, e.g., id.(2)(d) (applying requirements to decisions to “censor” and “shadow 
ban”). 




in addition to the implicit requirement that every time a provider considers acting 
against content, it must assess whether the user involved is a candidate or journalistic 
enterprise under the Act and whether enforcement would subject the provider to 
liability.33  
 These new burdens on content moderation activity will force providers to 
make stark choices, the consequences of which will flow to consumers. Confronted 
with the high costs of compliance or limited capacity to satisfy the procedural 
requirements to moderate content,34 providers may choose to stop moderating 
content altogether unless required by law, scale down their content moderation 
policies to limit enforcement to the worst of the worst violations, or change aspects 
of how their services operate to try to promote safety without triggering the Act. For 
example, providers may start collecting more personal information from consumers 
for identity verification or charging fees to discourage inappropriate behavior or 
cover increased costs.35  
                                                
33 See id.(2)(h) & (j). It is unclear whether moderators could determine through 
research whether entities, particularly private entities, qualify as a “journalistic 
enterprise.” 
34 See, e.g., Myths & Facts About Section 230, https://www.theinternet.works/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/Myths-Facts-About-Section-230-Full-InternetWorks.pdf 
(costs of content moderation). 
35 These solutions have recently been suggested to curb online abuse. See, e.g., 
Andrew Woodcock, Priti Patel considering removing right to anonymity on social 
media to stop ‘relentless’ abuse of MPs, Independent (Oct. 17, 2021), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/priti-patel-david-amess-social-




These consequences disadvantage consumers in multiple ways, such as by 
limiting or disrupting the: 
● variety of online services that they can choose as a result of the new 
barrier to entry for smaller services that will have to comply once they 
meet revenue or usership thresholds;36  
● low friction to using online services with minimal registration 
requirements helping a more diverse set of communities have access to 
online services than would if providers verify identities through credit 
cards or government-issued identification;37  
                                                
media-b1939775.html; Sara Brown, Social media is broken. A new report offers 25 
ways to fix it, MIT Sloan School of Management (June 30, 2021), 
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/social-media-broken-a-new-report-
offers-25-ways-to-fix-it.  
36 The Act will impact small and medium-sized companies that can meet one of the 
thresholds. Though the Act targets “big tech,” the chosen thresholds cover many 
companies. For example, Wikipedia identifies 32 social networking sites that have 
100 Million or more users. Wikipedia, List of social media platforms with at least 
100 million active users, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_platforms_with_at_least_100_million
_active_users (last visited November 2, 2021). High compliance costs and 
significant legal risks make it harder for these sites to continue to operate and 
create a barrier to entry for new services that will have to comply once they meet 
revenue or usership thresholds.  
37 See, e.g., Derek du Preez, ID verification for social media as a solution to online 
abuse is a terrible idea, diginomica (July 13, 2021), 
 https://diginomica.com/id-verification-social-media-solution-online-abuse-
terrible-idea (explaining the risks of identity verification requirements). 




● wide access to free services vital to ensuring online services are broadly 
accessible and not merely available to those who can afford to pay.38 
 In addition, the compelled disclosures in the Act will also increase consumer 
exposure to potentially dangerous content. Section 501.2041(3)(d), requiring 
disclosure of details on how policy-violating content was identified, will aid all 
manner of bad actors, including spammers and scammers, in evading provider 
detection. If a post is tagged as spam because it is directed at 50 users, the spammer 
will know to only send it to 49 users next time. Given that providers identify and 
remove billions of pieces of spam in a quarter, even if only some of the offending 
content evades detection, it will have a measurable adverse impact on both services 
and consumers.39  
The Act also explicitly limits the use of various safety tools, such as 
downranking, interstitials, and labels.40 This will impede a broad range of actions 
taken to benefit consumers, such as: 
                                                
38 Free services will become less common as companies seek to cover the costs of 
compliance and address the increased risk of business-ending litigation.  
39 See, e.g., Facebook Transparency Report, 
https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-
enforcement/spam/facebook#CONTENT_ACTIONED. See also, Jean Whitmore, 
The Arms Race of Models: Complexify or Die (June 24, 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3867464 (describing the “arms race” between spammers 
and spam filter-builders). 
40 Section 501.2041 of the Act regulates providers who “censor,” “shadow ban” or 
engage in “post-prioritization.” The definitions of these terms capture actions taken 




● Screening, labeling, or providing an interstitial before sensitive content, such 
excessively violent media, including terrorist beheadings.41 
● Flagging content that has been determined by a fact-checking organization to 
be false or inserting helpful resources for users who search for content about 
drug addiction or suicide.42  
● Downranking low quality content. For example, Google Search downranks 
sites that fail to satisfy quality factors by having issues like intrusive 
interstitials, a lack of security, or a history of copyright complaints.43 
● Labeling certain commercial content to help users shop for items they want or 
showing customer ratings for sellers. 
                                                
to protect users from potentially sensitive or abusive content, such as warning 
labels, restricting access through filters, and downranking. See Section 
501.2041(1)(b) & (e)-(f).  
41 Twitter Help Center, Sensitive media policy (Nov. 2019), 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/media-policy. 
42 The Act regulates placing content “above” other content. See Fla. Stat. § 
507.2014(1)(e). 
43 Google Search Central, Webmaster guidelines (last updated Oct. 28, 2021), 
https://developers.google.com/search/docs/advanced/guidelines/webmaster-
guidelines. 




  Under the Act, these activities are “censorship” or “shadow banning” and are 
subject to many of the same burdensome obligations as for other content moderation 
decisions, like content removal.44 
C. THE ACT INTRODUCES RISK THAT CHILLS ACTIONS 
INTENDED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
 
The Act’s “consistent” moderation requirement further chills provider speech 
and actions that safeguard consumers. Sec. 501.2041(2)(b) requires, but then fails to 
define what constitutes “consistent” moderation. In practice, it may require nothing 
short of perfection.45 The Act subjects a provider to potential liability any time an 
adverse content moderation action is taken against a user if—whether it was known 
to the provider—another user has similarly violated the provider’s rules, but has not 
                                                
44 It is ironic that a law designed to discourage content removal may encourage it. 
For example, use of filters to screen out objectionable user-generated content is a 
requirement for Apple’s App Store. Apple App Store Review Guidelines, Section 
1.2 (last updated Oct. 22, 2021), https://developer.apple.com/app-
store/review/guidelines/ (allowing incidental “not safe for work” content if hidden 
by default). Without the ability to “hide” content, providers may choose to prohibit 
and delete content to maintain the ability to distribute their app to iOS users. 
45 This is likely an unattainable goal, yet the state attempts to characterize the 
consistency requirement as an “incidental burden.” This fails to understand the 
challenges of content moderation at scale. See Katie Schoolov, Why content 
moderation costs billions and is so tricky for Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
others, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/27/content-
moderation-on-social-media.html; Timothy Geigner, Facebook, AI Moderation 
Continues to Suck because Moderation At Scale is Impossible, techdirt (Oct. 20, 
2021), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20211020/13270147784/facebook-ai-
moderation-continues-to-suck-because-moderation-scale-is-impossible.shtml. 




yet been subject to enforcement. This seemingly requires a provider to identify all 
similar violations and take the same enforcement action every time it discovers a 
specific violation.46 Given the penalties, the Act turns the millions of content 
moderation decisions providers make every day into potential multi-million dollar 
gambles where the house always wins.  
The Act also poses a serious risk of harm to consumers by potentially 
interfering with critical safety tools that online services offer to users. Providers 
would face legal risk for offering tools that allow users to customize settings for 
what they see on a platform, as well as who may view their profile or messages. For 
example, Twitter allows users to “mute” a person or a topic. Facebook similarly 
allows users to “unfollow” another user or a group.47 Users make these moderation 
decisions, but providers execute them. This may violate the Act, because tailoring 
user experiences with these tools requires that providers restrict the visibility of 
                                                
46 The provider will also need to make a judgment call about what kind of 
violations must be treated consistently and what enforcement actions are 
consistent, as the Act provides no guidance. For example, it is unclear if it would 
be “consistent” for a provider to deplatform a user with a history of violations and 
simply warn a user with no prior history if in a particular instance their violations 
are similar. 
47 Facebook Help Center, How do I unfollow a person, Page or group on 
Facebook?, https://www.facebook.com/help/190078864497547. 




content—triggering the Act’s rules and requirements for “censor[ing]” and “shadow 
ban[ning].”48  
The effects of interfering with safety tools or settings could be catastrophic. 
Technology-enabled abuse has a profound impact on victims and there is a link 
between online stalking and offline violence.49 Because many survivors must be 
online for work or school, experts on domestic violence recommend use of the tools 
available on platforms to minimize the safety risks. For example, the National 
Network to End Domestic Violence has partnered with Twitter and Facebook to 
publish guides to educate survivors on how to use the services’ safety tools.50 
Blocking, for example, can prevent abusers from seeing a survivor’s content which 
may be critical to prevent the abuser from discovering the survivor’s location. 
Without safety tools, survivors may be deprived of options to protect themselves 
while using online services or, worse, confronted with serious risks to their physical 
and emotional safety.  
                                                
48 Section 501.2041(1)(b) & (e)-(f). 
49 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, “Ranking Needs for Fighting Digital Abuse: 
Sextortion, Swatting, Doxing, Cyberstalking, and Nonconsensual Pornography” 
(Nov. 20, 2020), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/ranking-needs-fighting-digital-
abuse-sextortion-swatting-doxing-cyberstalking. 
50 See Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, Technology Safety & Privacy: A 
Toolkit for Survivors, https://www.techsafety.org/resources-survivors (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2021). 




 The Act’s restrictions and burdens on content moderation are mostly enforced 
through both private rights of action and state enforcement actions, backed by harsh 
penalties including under the private right of action with statutory damages of 
$100,000 per violation with the potential for additional actual damages, punitive 
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs of the plaintiffs.51 These outsized penalties 
only heighten the Act’s chilling effect on providers. 
II. AN INJUNCTION IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
If allowed to take effect, the Act is very likely to quickly change the way 
hundreds of millions consumers experience the internet, exposing them to scams, 
fraud, hate speech, harassment, and other harmful content which is now subject to 
provider content moderation efforts. 
An injunction preserves the current state of the internet, including all the 
actions that providers currently take and the benefits they have for consumers, at 
least until the district court can determine whether the Act passes Constitutional 
muster. 
                                                
51 See Section 501.2041(6). 






 For these reasons, Amici urge the Court to rule for Appellees and affirm the 
decision of the federal district court to enter a preliminary injunction against S.B. 
7072.  
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